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ABSTRACT 
 
David P. McIntyre 
Antecedents of Growth in Network Competition: Quality or Quantity? 
(Under the direction of Dr. Richard A. Bettis) 
 
 This research examines the impact of two potential antecedents of growth in high-
technology, network industries. The first antecedent, installed base, is traditionally 
framed as a key driver of growth in these settings. The second, product quality, is thought 
to have only random influences on growth. This work tests the influence of both of these 
variables on growth in the packaged application software industry, and proposes that their 
relative influence may be contingent upon the network intensity of a given market or 
segment. In turn, installed base and timing of product release are proposed to have a 
significant impact on quality. 
 The sample for this study encompassed five segments of the packaged application 
software industry from 1986-1998, including word processing, spreadsheets, desktop 
publishing, CAD, and personal finance. Several results from the empirical analysis offer 
useful insights into the nature of network industries, and implications for strategic 
management in these domains. First, installed base size exhibits a negative relationship 
with growth that becomes more positive as size increases. Second, product quality is 
positively and significantly associated with installed base growth. Third, the impact of 
 ii
size on growth is shown to vary across industry segments, suggesting that the influence 
of network effects may not be as homogeneous as extant theory implies. Finally, installed 
base is associated with higher baseline product quality within periods, consistent with the 
notion that a large installed base confers learning-based advantages to quality. 
 Together, these findings indicate that competitive dynamics in network industries 
may be more complex than previously thought. This research extends existing theoretical 
and empirical work on network effects and positive feedback, and suggests new avenues 
for effective strategies in emerging high-technology settings. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent theoretical work encompassing strategy and industrial organization 
economics suggests that in many high-technology industries, the relatively stable 
outcomes engendered by diminishing returns to scale are largely absent. In these settings, 
a single firm can enjoy robust growth and industry dominance via forces of positive 
feedback that tend to push the market toward the adoption of a single product or product 
design. Network effects, whereby consumer adoption decisions are at least partly 
contingent on the size of a product’s installed base, are a critical component of this 
process. When consumers value a large cohort of fellow adopters, the firm with the 
largest network of previous adopters at a given time should be optimally positioned to 
win the battle for market dominance.  
 This premise has important implications for firm strategy. In competitive settings 
where network effects and positive feedback are evident (i.e., “network industries”), logic 
suggests that the ideal firm strategy is to build network size as quickly as possible (Hill, 
1997). Concurrent investments or actions by the firm aimed at improving the intrinsic 
quality of the focal product should be ancillary concerns, as the value to consumers of a 
given product is reflected largely by its network size, rather than simply by some 
“physical attribute embodied in each unit of the good” (Bental & Spiegel, 1995).  
A theoretical implication of this assertion is that products that emerge as dominant 
standards in network competition may not be the best ones in terms of intrinsic, stand-
alone quality. While this implication has become a tenet of the literature and pedagogy on 
network effects, empirical efforts to validate it are surprisingly sparse (Brynjolffson & 
Kemerer, 1996), and have provided mixed results. Furthermore, recent findings cast some 
doubt on the notion of inferior products dominating high-technology markets (Liebowitz 
& Margolis, 1999). 
This research incorporates perspectives from strategic management and industrial 
organization economics in developing and testing propositions about the relationships 
among installed base, product quality, and growth in network industry. This work offers 
several important contributions to the literature on strategy and network effects. First, the 
influence of installed base size on growth is tested in an industry setting that is often cited 
as an example of network-based competition and positive feedback – specifically, 
packaged application software. Second, the strength of the size-on-growth relationship is 
proposed to vary across industry segments as a result of heterogeneous network 
intensities in these segments. Third, product quality is offered and tested as a mediating 
variable in the relationship between size and growth in packaged software, suggesting 
that the role of quality may be understated by extant theory. Finally, installed base and 
timing of product introduction are offered as alternative drivers of quality in packaged 
software. Taken together, these contributions continue the trend in recent research of 
relaxing assumptions about the largely exogenous nature of performance outcomes in 
network industries (e.g., Schilling, 2002), and offer important implications for firm 
strategy. Furthermore, this research expands upon previous work on network effects by 
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using continuous and longitudinal measures of both quality and performance, as opposed 
to the categorical, outcome-based performance measures frequently used in previous 
literature. 
This study begins by describing the basic dynamics of network industries, and 
defining relevant constructs such as positive feedback, network effects, and technology 
lock-in. The theoretical model and hypotheses are then developed in the context of extant 
literature. After brief discussion of the sample, measures, and methodology, the results of 
the empirical tests are presented. The paper concludes with a discussion of the primary 
theoretical contributions of the research, as well as the limitations, possible extensions, 
and managerial implications of this work. 
If network effects and positive feedback are indeed becoming more salient 
concerns for managers in various knowledge- and technology-intensive industries 
(Arthur, 1996; Bettis & Hitt, 1995), then understanding the unique strategic dynamics of 
these settings is increasingly important for strategy researchers. In building on previous 
theoretical and empirical work in this domain, this research adds to the growing body of 
knowledge on network effects and positive feedback, and offers new insights into 
effective firm strategies in network competition. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 “Network” Industries: Characteristics and Prevalence 
 
Network effects are present when the value of a given product or technology to a 
potential consumer is at least partially contingent upon the number of people who have 
already adopted it (Katz & Shapiro, 1986; Farrell & Saloner, 1986). Examples of positive 
network effects are readily apparent in “pure” network products such as telephones, fax 
machines, or electronic mail, which have virtually no value in the absence of a network 
of consumers. In these cases, a given consumer will value a large network of fellow 
adopters, as this network is essential for deriving value from the product. The cumulative 
number of previous adopters at a given time in the product’s life (i.e., the network size) is 
the product’s installed base. In many high-technology markets, adopters value a large 
installed base due to their desire for interaction with other members of a network, but also 
because it serves to alleviate uncertainty about the viability of a given product 
(Brynjolffson & Kemerer, 1996), thus reassuring consumers that learning investments 
related to the product are worthwhile.  
Before proceeding with a discussion of network industries, a definitional 
clarification merits some discussion. A large number of previous studies on the influence 
of network effects refer to this phenomenon as network externalities (e.g., Katz & 
Shapiro, 1985; Brynjolffson, 1996; Schilling, 2002) However, the use of the term 
“externality” implies a market failure resulting from agents’ inability to efficiently 
internalize the costs and benefits of their network membership (Coase, 1960). The 
ostensible market failure of interest for this research, the predominance of sub-optimal 
products or product designs, will be discussed in greater detail later in this paper. For 
now, it is simply noted that the broader term network effects has been offered as a more 
apt description of network dynamics in high-technology industries (Liebowitz & 
Margolis, 1994). Recent literature illustrates increasingly widespread adoption of this 
terminology (e.g., Katz & Shapiro, 1994; Shankar & Bayus, 2003), and thus this paper 
uses the latter term throughout.  
 
2.2 Positive Feedback and Path Dependence 
 
The primacy of the installed base in the marketplace is not limited to the facile 
examples described previously. Indeed, Arthur (1996) contends that network effects are a 
salient feature of many contemporary high-technology industries. In these settings, 
competition is heavily influenced by positive feedback, in that each consumer adoption of 
a product increases the likelihood of future adoptions. As such, firms with an early lead 
in installed base tend to increase their lead, while those who fall behind tend to be 
competed out of the marketplace. Such industries are said to exhibit demand-side 
increasing returns to scale, as the value of a firm’s product(s) increases as its installed 
base grows. The precise processes by which early leaders emerge in a network industry 
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are often dependent upon random, exogenous shocks to the industry – i.e., “historical 
small events” (Arthur, 1989). Yet once a leading product design emerges, positive 
feedback tends to push a single design, and often its sponsoring firm, toward market 
dominance (Besen & Farrell, 1994).  
The presence of positive feedback in a competitive setting not only runs counter 
to traditional economic notions of negative feedback and diminishing returns, but also 
implies specific underlying properties of a network industry. Foremost among these 
properties is path dependence, the notion that the present structure of the industry is 
strongly dependent on events in previous time periods. The conceptual linkage with 
network effects is quite clear – those firms with large networks at t0 should enjoy greater 
growth in time t+1, as their large installed base is more attractive to adopters than those of 
competing firms (Schilling, 2002). However, a critical issue from a strategy perspective 
is the precise degree of present dependence on previous conditions. If path dependence is 
strictly dependent on network size, which in turn may be dependent on random events or 
influences, then widespread adoption of inferior products becomes possible. In an attempt 
to address this issue, Liebowitz and Margolis (1999) identified three basic types of path 
dependence from the perspective of adoption decisions influenced by network effects: 
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Table 2.1: Three types of path dependence (Liebowitz & Margolis, 1999) 
 
 
First degree: Adopters make decisions about products based on accurate information about the future, yet 
their decisions may seem sub-optimal at a given time in the evolution of the industry. 
 
 
Second degree: Information about the viability or quality of products is unclear at the time of adoption.  
 
 
Third degree: Adopter is well informed about the inferiority of a given product, but network benefits are 
so strong that the product is adopted. Switching and coordination costs are too great to migrate to a 
“superior” product. 
 
 
 While first- and even second-degree path dependence may seem regrettable and 
costly to adopters at some point in the life of the product, they are not necessarily 
inefficient, as adoption decisions were made based on the best available knowledge, and 
are remediable in nature. Third-degree path dependence, however, presents a more 
troubling scenario. In this case, consumers have full knowledge of the inferiority of a 
product, but the benefits of network membership and the possible costs incurred by 
adopting an alternative product are too great to overcome. Thus, network effects may 
foster scenarios where the value of the installed base has overwhelmed any intrinsic 
quality advantages offered by the product, and users are “stuck” with an inferior product. 
It is this artifact of third-degree path dependence that has become a tenet of the literature 
on network competition (Table 2.2) - if consumers truly value network size over other 
metrics of stand-alone product quality, then the unsettling possibility arises that products, 
product designs, and technological standards may emerge that are of sub-optimal quality. 
The next section describes several contentions in this regard. 
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2.3 Lock-in and Product Inferiority: Narrative Evidence 
 
David’s (1985) work effectively illustrates the theoretical arguments surrounding 
the process by which an apparently inferior product design virtually locks in the focal 
market. This historical narrative describes the evolution of the QWERTY keyboard 
standard. When purchasing a typewriter, each new adopter had to decide whether to make 
costly investments in learning a certain keyboard layout.  The increasing installed base of 
QWERTY led adopters to believe that learning investments in this layout would allow for 
greater future returns to these investments, through a greater range in employment 
opportunities in the larger network of firms and individuals using the layout. By the time 
that ostensibly better layouts were introduced, users did not want to incur the switching 
costs associated with learning a new layout. Thus, the QWERTY design evolved into a de 
facto standard because consumers valued compatibility and reduced uncertainty for the 
emerging technology. Cowan (1990) describes a similar scenario in nuclear power 
technology, as light water reactors became the predominant technology due to early 
adoption and investments by the U.S. Navy. By the time civilian markets developed for 
nuclear power, light water’s dominance was unassailable, even by potentially superior 
technologies.  
These narratives have served to illustrate the unique dynamics of network 
industries discussed previously. Perhaps the most widely referenced of these dynamics is 
the aforementioned notion that network effects and positive feedback can lead to 
dominance by inferior or sub-optimal products in high-technology settings (Table 2.2). 
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 Table 2.2: On the nature of product inferiority resulting from network effects 
 
 
Besen & Farrell, 1994 
 
“Because buyers want compatibility with the 
installed base, products that arrive later may be 
unable to displace poorer, but earlier standards.” 
 
 
Shapiro & Varian, 1999 
 
“In a network industry, success and failure are 
driven as much by expectations [from network size] 
and luck as by the underlying value of the product.” 
 
 
Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997 
 
“The reality is that the companies with the best 
products will not always win.” 
 
 
Schilling, 1998 
 
“…Early technology offerings may become so 
entrenched that a firm offering subsequent 
technologies, even if they are considered technically 
superior, may be unable to gain a foothold…” 
 
  
 
2.4 Strategy in Network Competition 
  
 Network industries present a compelling context for the study of firm 
performance, as positive feedback can enable the type of superior performance, even 
dominance, which strategy research seeks to identify and explain. Indeed, as proprietary 
product designs evolve into industry-level dominant designs (Utterback, 1996), an 
enormously profitable opportunity may exist for the sponsoring firm (Ferguson & Morris, 
1993). However, the notion that such performance is contingent upon factors outside of 
the firm’s realm of influence presents a difficult conundrum for strategy practitioners. 
Thus, a nascent literature has begun to address the role of strategy in high-technology, 
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network-based competition. Selected results of this stream of research include the 
importance of an early installed base in network competition (Besen & Farrell, 1994; 
Hill, 1997), the avoidance of early or late market entry in determining the viability of a 
technology (Schilling, 2002), and the role of expectations management in network 
competition (Katz & Shapiro, 1994). 
 Despite these theoretical and prescriptive advances, managers still face a great 
deal of uncertainty about effective strategies in network competition. While a strategy of 
preemption via building an early installed base is sensible in the context of extant theory, 
the extent to which firms must make baseline investments in product quality remain 
largely unclear. As noted previously, theoretical conceptualizations and narratives of 
network industries describe circumstances where sub-optimal product designs came to 
dominate the market. Yet these conceptualizations, as well as many empirical studies of 
network effects, generally take an outcome-based view of competition – i.e., 
retrospectively delimiting winners from losers, high quality products from low quality 
ones. However, deriving robust implications for strategy requires a shift in focus to the 
process of network-based competition, and the unique characteristics and capabilities of 
the firms engaged in such competition.  
 A study of dynamic network competition over time would effectively facilitate 
such a shift, and largely eliminate any hindsight bias that may reinforce negative 
perceptions of product quality a posteriori. Furthermore, such an approach allows for an 
examination of the role of quality relative to alternative products at a given point in time, 
illustrating whether third-degree path dependence can indeed overwhelm consumer 
preferences. If product quality does indeed have an incremental impact on patterns of 
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adoption, then investments and actions related to innovation and product quality become 
critical variables for the firm, and the spectrum of strategic options available to managers 
in network competition may be more complex than previously thought.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
 
3.1: Antecedents of Growth in a Network Industry: Installed Base and Product 
Quality 
 
 The research and narratives described in the previous chapter suggest that in 
network industries, consumers derive value from two aspects of a given product – its 
network value, and its network-independent value. For example, for certain computer 
applications consumers value the ability to interact and exchange files with a compatible 
network, as well as stand-alone product attributes such as a simple graphical interface 
(Brynjolffson & Kemerer, 1996). More generally, network value is a reflection of the 
benefits associated with a large cohort of fellow adopters (installed base) for the product, 
while network-independent value represents benefits conferred by intrinsic, “physical 
attributes embodied in each unit of the good” (Bental & Spiegel, 1995). In the most 
extreme cases of third-degree path dependence, a theoretical consequent of network 
effects is that a product’s network value subsumes any network-independent benefits. As 
a result, quality differentiation among competing products becomes irrelevant, and 
adoption of inferior products and product designs may occur.  
 The following section incorporates a process-based, rather than outcome-based, 
perspective on the dynamics of network industries. A theoretical model incorporating 
installed base, network-independent quality, and growth is offered, and further 
propositions regarding effective firm strategy in network competition are described. 
 
3.1.1 Effects of Installed Base Size on Growth: A Network-Dependent Perspective  
 
 While a broad literature in strategy and industrial organization has found mixed 
effects in the relationship between organizational size and growth (e.g., Penrose, 1955; 
Hymer and Pashigian, 1962; Evans, 1987; Hall, 1987), these studies focus primarily on 
manufacturing industries, in which the benefits of network effects are largely absent 
(Arthur, 1996). Conversely, in network industries, the size of a product’s installed base 
beyond some critical threshold is thought to be a primary determinant of its growth. 
Specifically, a larger installed base confers at least three types of benefits to potential 
adopters:  
 
• Direct network benefits: In settings where the value of the product is largely a 
function of the number of other individuals or firms using it, direct network 
effects are present (Chacko & Mitchell, 1998). Examples include 
telecommunications networks and certain types of computer software, wherein 
network participants interact frequently, and thus value compatibility with a large 
number of other participants. 
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• Reduced uncertainty: When product adoption requires some degree of learning 
investments by consumers, uncertainty about the returns to these investments can 
be problematic. A large installed base acts as a signal that a given product exhibits 
some degree of long-term viability, thereby reducing uncertainty and assuring 
adopters that investments in learning will be beneficial. (Brynjolffson & Kemerer, 
1996), 
 
• Indirect effects: A large installed base is thought to attract producers of 
complementary goods and services to the focal product (Schilling, 2002). For 
example, software vendors must decide which operating system platforms to 
target when developing new applications. The platform with the larger installed 
base offers a larger potential pool of adopters for the application, over which the 
vendor may be able to exploit economies of scale in production. (Chacko & 
Mitchell, 1998) 
 
 These dynamics of network industries suggest that the size of a product’s installed 
base at a given time is a critical determinant of its growth. Yet surprisingly, direct tests of 
the impact of installed base on product adoption (i.e., the effect of a product’s installed 
base size on its growth) are rather sparse in this domain of research. Several studies have 
used a product’s price premium to indicate the value of compatibility with a large 
network (Gandal, 1994; Brynjolffson & Kemerer, 1996), and others have noted the role 
of network effects in driving technology adoptions at the firm level (Saloner & Shepherd, 
1995; Majumdar & Venkatraman, 1998). However, this stream of research has largely 
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neglected the seemingly most direct test of network effects – the effect of installed base 
on growth. If network size is indeed the primary determinant of growth in high-
technology settings, a significant size-on-growth effect should provide preliminary 
evidence for the presence of positive feedback via network effects.  
 A positive relationship between installed base size and growth should provide a 
baseline indication that consumers in a high-technology setting value network size as a 
result of some or all of the associated benefits described previously. Note, however, that 
while a significant size-on-growth coefficient implies the presence of path dependence, it 
does not by itself indicate the degree of path dependence. In other words, while a 
significant effect may be illustrative of network value, it does not necessarily imply that 
the existence of such network value leads to inefficient or sub-optimal outcomes. Thus:  
 
Hypothesis 1a: In a network industry, the larger the installed base of a product, the 
greater its growth in the following period.  
 
 
3.1.2 Market Share as a Moderator in the Size-Growth Relationship 
 
Chacko and Mitchell’s (1998) work is one of the few empirical studies that tests a 
direct relationship between size and growth in a network industry. One key finding of this 
study is that installed base size has an increasingly positive effect on growth, but only 
beyond some critical mass of installed base. A plausible explanation for this finding is 
that below some critical threshold, network size does not fully convey the benefits of 
network membership to potential adopters, and thus does not adequately influence their 
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expectations about the viability of a product. This logic is consistent with the notion that 
network industries tend to be “tippy” – once a firm’s installed base achieves some critical 
mass, positive feedback increases its lead (Besen & Farrell, 1994).  
The finding that a requisite critical mass is required to adequately convey network 
benefits to potential adopters suggests that postulating a straightforward size on growth 
relationship may oversimplify the nature of network dynamics. As such, it is useful to 
incorporate a measure of installed base relative to competing products, such as market 
share. Low market share indicates that a product has been unable to achieve the requisite 
mass to enjoy network dynamics, while a higher market share conveys broader visibility 
and network value to potential adopters. Thus, as market share increases, we expect to 
see a significant increase in the relationship between installed base size and growth. 
However, if we allow that some potential adopters have a natural affinity toward 
alternative or niche products, then the marginal costs of attracting these consumers may 
eventually become prohibitive. Furthermore, for virtually any product class, the number 
of new adopters tends to decrease as the product market matures (Bass, 1969; Mahajan, 
Muller & Bass, 1995). Thus, as market share continues to increase, the size on growth 
relationship should weaken again as the switching costs for remaining consumers become 
proportionally higher, and the sponsoring firm has less incentive to invest in attracting 
new adopters (Turner, Bettis, & DeSanctis, 2003): 
 
Hypothesis 1b: In a network industry, the relationship between installed base and growth 
will be more positive at medium levels of market share than at high or low levels. 
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3.1.3 Effects of Product Quality on Growth: A Network-Independent Perspective  
 
 The conclusion that installed base size is the primary determinant of growth and 
performance outcomes in high-technology industries is not universally supported. Indeed, 
several empirical examinations of network industries suggest that network-independent 
dimensions of products play a more important role in performance outcomes than 
suggested by existing theory. For example, Brynjolffson and Kemerer (1996) find 
evidence that even when network benefits are present, consumers place a premium on 
certain network-independent aspects of spreadsheet software, such as the presence of a 
graphical interface and sorting functions.  
 This proposition, that adopters value the quality of network-independent 
characteristics of a product, is consistent with the broader contention in the strategy 
literature that “customers tend to be drawn to quality outputs, and form loyalties toward 
the providers of those outputs” (Kroll, et. al., 1999). Furthermore, high product quality 
relative to competitors can result in increased demand for the product (McGuire, 
Schneeweis & Branch, 1990), and thus positively impact the financial performance of the 
firm (Hendricks & Singhal, 1996; Kroll, et. al., 1999). Yet before I advance the argument 
that quality matters in a network industry, I will first address the precise nature of quality 
itself. 
 In the strategy literature, “quality” is a complex and multi-dimensional construct.   
In the specific context of network dynamics and increasing returns, I use product quality 
to describe characteristics of a given good in a network-independent context. More 
specifically, quality refers to the superiority or inferiority of physical attributes of the 
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product relative to competing products, independent of the benefits conferred by its 
network size. Figure 3 provides several examples of such attributes. 
 
Table 3.1: Examples of network-independent attributes of network products 
 
Product  Network-Independent 
Attribute 
 
Quality Metrics Reference 
 
Video Cassettes  
 
 
Playback length 
 
Tape capacity 
 
Lardner, 1987  
 
Typewriter Keyboards 
 
 
Layout 
 
Average and maximum 
typing speeds 
 
 
David, 1985 
 
Video games 
 
 
Processor power 
 
Clock speed, bit count 
 
Schilling, 2003 
 
Television 
 
Color vs. black & white 
 
Clarity, reliability of 
picture 
 
 
Shapiro & Varian, 
1999 
 
 
This definition of quality implies several assumptions about the nature of network 
industries, each of which merit a brief discussion. First, this definition suggests an 
explicit de-coupling of network-based and network-independent sources of value to 
consumers, which is consistent with the logic of extant views on network effects (Table 
2.2). Second, the assertion of a significant impact of quality on patterns of adoption 
assumes that the markets for these goods are vertically differentiated, i.e. that consumers 
ideally will prefer higher quality goods within segments, ceteris paribus.  Finally, this 
research holds that software markets and segments involve one-sided or “same-side” 
network effects, whereby the benefits of adoption accrue largely to adopters, as opposed 
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to two-sided networks which involve a more complex interplay of network benefits 
among multiple constituents (Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne, 2006; Parker & Van 
Alstyne, 2005) 
In a series of papers, Liebowitz and Margolis (1990, 1994, 1995) highlight the 
role of product quality in determining outcomes in network industries. The authors argue 
that cases of non-remediable market failure where an inferior product dominates the 
market must be exceedingly rare, as such outcomes must assume that consumers are 
unduly constrained in remediating these situations. Furthermore, they find that in settings 
where network effects should be strong, such as spreadsheets and word processors, 
dominant products tend to be those that exhibit the highest quality (Liebowitz & 
Margolis, 1999). This finding suggests that consumers do indeed tend to adopt the 
highest quality alternative, even when network benefits are evident.  
These results indicate that extant theory describing market dominance by inferior 
products or product designs in network industries may be overlooking or underestimating 
the explanatory influence of product quality. One possible explanation for this 
phenomenon is the outcome-oriented approach implicitly advocated by much of the 
literature – i.e., labeling firms and technologies as winners and losers, locked-in or locked 
out. Such labels ascribe static characteristics to competitive settings that are 
fundamentally dynamic and complex in nature. Furthermore, an outcome-based 
orientation allows for the possibility that post hoc characterizations of product quality 
may be unduly influenced by hindsight bias. Recall that for conditions of third-degree 
(extreme) path-dependence to hold, and objectively inferior products to dominate, 
consumers must adopt products that are demonstrably inferior to existing alternatives at 
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the time of the adoption decision, and must be unable or unwilling to incur the switching 
costs associated with migrating to the “better” product. An outcome-oriented approach to 
assessing the quality-dominance relationship may introduce an inordinate focus on 
dimensions of quality that may or may not have been relevant concerns for consumers at 
the time of adoption.  
In summary, previous empirical findings suggest that product quality has a 
positive influence on both consumer preferences and firm returns, even in industries 
where network benefits are present. Furthermore, recent work suggests that high-quality 
products tend to be predominant even when consumers value network size. As such, in a 
network industry, the quality of network-independent attributes may play a distinct role 
in providing positive feedback to a given product and its sponsoring firm: 
 
Hypothesis 2: In a network industry, the greater the quality of a product at a given time, 
the greater its installed base growth in the following period.  
 
Taken together, Hypotheses 1a and 2 reflect two potential sources of positive 
feedback in network industries – one network-dependent (installed base size) and one 
network-independent (product quality), while Hypothesis 1b examines the moderating 
role of market share in the size on growth relationship. 
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t0 t1 
Product Quality H2 (+)
H1a (+)
Installed Base 
Growth 
H1b (-/+)
Market Share
 
 
 
 
3.2 Variation in Network Intensity Across Segments 
 
 From a strategy perspective, the absolute strength of the effects of installed base 
and quality on growth may be less informative than their strength relative to each other. 
For example, in online auctions, we expect that installed base size plays a very strong 
role in driving network growth, as such auctions have almost no residual value in the 
absence of a network of fellow adopters1. However, other products, such as video game 
consoles, have a great deal of value to individual users in the absence of network 
interaction. For both online auctions and video games, consumers derive some value from 
                                                 
1 This residual value can also be conceptualized as the autarky value of the product, or the value of the 
product assuming no interaction among users (Liebowitz & Margolis, 1999). For consistency, I will 
continue to refer to this as network-independent value, though I view the terms as largely interchangeable. 
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interacting with a network, yet in the case of video games, the proportion of total value 
derived from network membership is likely lower than in online auctions.  
 Figure 5 presents a very basic illustration of this notion, with the light region 
representing the proportion of a product’s value that is dependent on network size, and 
the shaded region representing the proportion of network-independent value. If the total 
value of a network product is conceptualized as the sum of its network value and 
network-independent value, then one would expect video game consoles to lie near point 
A, as consumers can derive value from simply using the console, as well as the ability to 
exchange or play online games with fellow users. In contrast, online auctions would lie 
closer to point B, as the brunt of their value comes from the consumer’s ability to interact 
with the largest possible network of users.  
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of network intensity 
 
 
  
The network intensity of a given product can be conceptualized as the proportion 
of total value that consumers derive from network interaction for a given product, ceteris 
paribus. Understanding this intensity has several implications for strategic management. 
First, network intensity may explain why we often see variation in the number of product 
standards across network industries (Eisenmann, 2006). When network intensity is high, 
we would expect to see a higher prevalence of “winner-take-all” product markets, where 
an early leader comes to dominate the market. For a product market with lower network 
intensity, we would expect to see a higher incidence of multiple, evolving standards2. 
Second, network intensity may inform the firm’s optimal strategy in a given market or 
market segment. When network intensity is high, then extant theory suggests early entry 
and quickly building an installed base; as network intensity decreases, competition 
                                                 
2 Consider the two examples offered previously. The value of an online auction comes almost entirely from 
the availability of a large network, and the industry has closely approximated a classic “winner-take-all” 
story. The network intensity of video game consoles should be lower due to their higher network-
independent value, and this has manifested in multiple, dynamic standards over the past 20+ years.      
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becomes increasingly focused on quality differentiation between competing products. 
Finally, a greater understanding of network intensity may allow for the possibility that 
firms can manipulate certain aspects of their products to make them more or less network 
intensive3. For example, an online auction company may try to increase the network-
independent value of its product by adding a multi-service Web portal interface. 
Conversely, online video gaming can be viewed as an attempt to add direct network value 
to a stand-alone console. 
 In the packaged application software industry, it is reasonable to expect that 
network intensity varies across different product segments (Table 3.2). For instance, we 
expect to see stronger intensity in the word processing and spreadsheet segments, as the 
outputs of these applications are commonly shared within and across organizations. In 
contrast, applications such as desktop publishing and personal finance may be less 
network-intensive, as their outputs (brochures, personal financial records, etc.) tend to 
have value largely to a single user, or to a relatively small cohort around that focal user. 
Table 3.2 presents a formal presentation of this assertion, illustrating the extent to which 
the three dimensions of network value influence each segment. Where applicable, I have 
noted previous theoretical and empirical work that supports the characterizations of each 
segment. Note that while desktop publishing and personal finance are classified as 
packaged software products, there are (to my knowledge) no empirical validations of the 
influence of network effects in these segments, lending credence to their labels as lower-
network intensity segments. 
 
                                                 
3 Note, however, that I have modeled network intensity as an exogenous aspect of the product market. 
Nonetheless, the notion that firms can manipulate network intensity is an intriguing one, and will be 
discussed further in Chapter 6. 
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Table 3.2: Network intensity in packaged application software 
 
 
Segment Direct Effects Uncertainty/Viability 
Effects 
Indirect Effects Network 
Intensity 
Word 
Processing 
High Medium Medium-High HIGH 
(Katz & 
Shapiro, 1994) 
Widespread 
interaction among 
users in the 
workplace, bulk 
corporate users 
 
Initial switching costs 
strong, but increasing 
compatibility, GUIs 
increasing the ease of 
switching 
 
Availability of 
plug-ins, 
accessories may 
draw borderline 
adopters 
 
Spreadsheets High Medium-High Medium  HIGH 
(Gandal, 1995; 
Brynjolffoson 
& 
Kemerer, 
1996) 
Widespread 
interaction among 
users in the workplace 
 
Many complex 
functions, macros 
unique among products, 
raising switching costs 
 
Primarily 
interaction with 
external databases 
 
CAD Medium-Low Medium Medium MEDIUM 
(Astebro, 
2002) 
Users tend to be 
highly specialized; 
findings suggest only a 
modest size-on-growth 
impact 
High-end products can 
run into the thousands 
of dollars; design 
interfaces range from 
intuitive to highly 
complex 
 
Various plug-ins 
and extensions 
available 
 
Desktop 
Publishing 
Medium Low Medium LOW 
 Uses include 
newspaper layouts, 
internal corporate 
publications – intra-
organization 
compatibility is more 
important than gross 
network size 
 
Most interfaces are 
graphically based, 
similar to word 
processors 
Compatibility with 
photo, illustration 
software is a 
concern 
 
Personal 
Finance 
Low Low Medium LOW 
 Prior to Internet, 
virtually no network 
interaction required 
 
Most low-end 
applications require 
limited proprietary 
learning 
Initially low, 
increasingly 
prevalent with 
online banking and 
other interactions 
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Observing significant variance in the effects of size-on-growth in these segments 
would provide very preliminary evidence that network intensity is heterogeneous across 
these industry segments. Thus, in the packaged software industry, we propose the 
following hypothesis relating to the influence of network intensity across product 
segments: 
 
H3: The effect of installed base size on growth will increase as the network intensity of a 
segment increases. 
 
 
3.3 Antecedents of Product Quality in a Network Industry 
 
One obstacle to effective strategy formulation in a network industry resides in the 
assumption that both installed base and product quality are largely the result of random 
and exogenous forces in these settings. Building on the previously described theoretical 
model, the following section proposes two variables that may influence the quality of the 
firm’s product releases, and thus offers further insights into the dynamics of effective 
strategy in network competition. The first variable, installed base size, is hypothesized to 
impact product quality through accumulated learning effects. The second, timing of 
release, is suggested to affect product quality via temporal learning effects.  
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3.3.1 Alternative Perspectives on Learning and Product Quality 
 
While installed base size and product quality were hypothesized to have 
independent direct effects on growth, extant theory suggests a significant relationship 
between these two variables as well. Specifically, an organizational learning perspective 
suggests that size plays an important role in determining the quality of the firm’s output. 
In addition to its role as a reflection of accumulated learning, size may confer additional 
advantages with respect to product quality, such as more productive research and 
development activities (Henderson & Cockburn, 1996), and the ability to spread fixed 
R&D costs over a larger output (Cohen, 1995). However, this section will focus 
specifically on two types of organizational learning that may affect quality: learning over 
production and over time. 
The firm’s learning orientation has been hypothesized to have a significant impact 
its viability in high-technology industries (Schilling, 1998) via increased absorptive 
capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989), but the precise mechanisms by which learning 
occurs at the firm level remain unclear.  In manufacturing-based industries, learning 
curves in production are thought to be an effective empirical illustration of the learning 
process. The basic premise of such a curve is straightforward - as firms produce more of 
a product, unit cost decreases at a decreasing rate (Argote & Epple, 1990; Adler & Clark, 
1991). Because the rate of learning is assumed to be relatively stable across firms – 
roughly a 20% drop in unit costs per doubling of cumulative output – the existence of 
such a curve has been implied to confer first-mover advantages in multiple industries, 
including network industries (Arthur, 1996).  
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Progress in production efficiency is one metric by which firm learning can be 
measured, but it is not only one (Levin, 2000). The quality of the firm’s output, rather 
than the unit cost of such output, may be an equally important metric from a strategic 
vantage point (Fine, 1986; Cole, 1990; Levin, 2000). From this perspective, firm learning 
represents more than a simple reflection of productivity- or efficiency-based knowledge 
gains, but also the active acquisition of quality-based knowledge (Li & Rajagopalan, 
1998).  
If product quality is indeed illustrative of the firm’s stock of quality-based 
knowledge at a given point in time, then understanding the factors influencing the 
acquisition of this knowledge takes on increased importance. As noted previously, 
cumulative production is thought to be one driver of productivity-based learning. Yet 
cumulative output may have a similar influence on quality-based learning, as the firm 
gains experience in identifying and mitigating production defects, as well as a larger base 
of users to provide feedback on technical bugs or other design-related limitations. 
Though installed base is an imperfect measure of cumulative production, it does reflect 
some level of heterogeneity in accumulated output among competing firms. Furthermore, 
if knowledge acquired in production depreciates over time (Argote, Beckman & Epple, 
1990), implying that more recent production is a more accurate indicator of learning, then 
installed base size should provide a reasonable reflection of quality-based firm learning.  
In summary, theories of learning via cumulative production underlie the following 
hypothesis with respect to the relationship between installed base and product quality in a 
network industry: 
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Hypothesis 4: The size of a firm’s installed base will be positively associated with the 
quality of its product releases.    
 
Though learning over cumulative output has established a strong theoretical 
foundation among strategists, learning may have temporal dimensions as well. For some 
aspects of product quality, such as long-term reliability, time is a necessary component of 
learning, as the quality attribute can only be accurately discerned after a certain time lag 
(Levin, 2000).  Furthermore, cumulative output models may be limited by their 
simplifying assumptions that that learning is stable and persistent over the life of 
production (Argote, Beckman & Epple, 1990). As such, a time-based perspective may be 
a more informative indicator of firm learning, as it allows for the possibility that firms 
actively engage in quality-based improvements over time, rather than simply absorbing 
incremental improvements over the life of production. 
This de-coupling of learning and production experience implies that firms not 
only learn through their own cumulative experience, but can also by observation of the 
successes and failures of competing firms and products (Levin, 2000). In industries where 
product releases tend to be relatively generational and parallel across firms4, such as 
automobiles and packaged software, the concept of “learning before doing” suggests that 
there may be benefits to delaying the release of product innovations. This notion is 
consistent with idea that first-mover status in high-technology settings may have 
significant disadvantages, particularly when the underlying technology and customer 
needs are shifting (Liberman & Montgomery, 1988). In sum, a time-based learning 
                                                 
4 See Chapter 4 for a more detailed description of generational vs. incremental product innovation. 
 29
perspective on quality provides a basis for the benefits of delaying generational product 
releases: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Within generational products, first movers will tend to exhibit lower 
quality than later releases. 
 
In conclusion, Hypotheses 4 and 5 frame installed base size and timing of release 
as factors influencing the network-independent quality of a firm’s products. These 
hypotheses serve to complete a partially mediated model of installed base size, product 
quality, and growth in a network industry, and illustrate a strategic tension regarding 
product releases network industries, namely the trade-off between learning through 
experience in a market segment vs. learning by delaying a generational release. 
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 Figure 3.2: Antecedents of quality and growth in a network industry 
 
 
t0 t1 
First Mover 
H5 (-) Product Quality
Installed Base
Growth 
H4(+) 
H2 (+)
H1a (+)
Network Intensity 
H3 (+) 
Market Share
H1b (-/+)
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Sample  
 
 In order to test the hypotheses for this study, a sample of product releases in the 
packaged application software industry (NAICS 511210) was gathered. In the empirical 
literature, various segments of application software have been offered as representative 
examples of network industries (Brynjolfsson & Kemerer, 1996; Chacko & Mitchell, 
1997; Liebowitz & Margolis, 1999). For this particular research, cross-sectional and time 
series data were gathered on a sample of software releases in five segments of packaged 
software from 1986-1998.  
To ensure that platform effects did hold undue influence on growth patterns, the 
sample was limited to software compatible with the DOS/Windows operating systems. 
Windows-based application software first appeared sporadically in the sample in 1990, 
and gained a substantial foothold by 1993.  
 The raw sample for the study totaled 247 product-years encompassing 31 product 
lines in the word processing, spreadsheets, desktop publishing, CAD, and personal 
finance segments. Of these, installed base data was incomplete for approximately 16% of 
the observations, and a subset of the observations (19%) incorporated multiple imputation 
procedures for incomplete quality data5. These procedures resulted in a final sample of 
207 product-years. Yearly data on market share, sales, shipments, and revenue were 
gathered from a dataset based on reports provided by IDC (International Data 
Corporation) and DataQuest, both leading providers of market research in software and 
other information technologies6. Information on product quality, product release dates, 
corporate parents, and general background were gathered through archival searches of 
software trade journals and periodicals, including InfoWorld, PC World, PC Magazine, 
PC Week and Byte.  
 
4.2 Example of product-year observation 
 
 A typical product-year observation included information about a product’s name, 
sponsoring firm, quality ratings, date of release, installed base, and other variables. To 
illustrate the nature of this data, consider the following observation, selected at random 
from the sample: 
 
Table 4.1: Typical product-year observation 
 
Product Name/Version DisplayWrite 4.2 
Year 1989 
Sponsoring Firm IBM 
                                                 
5 See Chapter 5 and Appendix B for details. To ensure the integrity of the imputed values, I also compared 
the imputed data set with the raw data set – see Chapter 5. 
 
6 Special thanks to Stephen Margolis, Stan Liebowitz, Rich Bettis, and Scott Turner for assistance in 
tracking down this data. 
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Platform DOS 
Segment Word Processing 
Date of Release August 1, 1989 
InfoWorld Overall Quality 4.8 
       Performance .25 
       Documentation .50 
       Ease of Use .625 
       Error Handling .50 
       Technical Support .75 
       Value .50 
Date of Quality Review October 30, 1989 
Installed Base (t0) 625,000 
List Price $495 
Retail Price $267 
Market Share (Revenue) 8.9% 
Market Share (Units) 14.3% 
 
 It is interesting to note that for the quality reviews, the overall quality ratings were 
not simple linear combinations of each quality dimension – i.e., the overall rating and the 
rating of performance, support, and other sub-dimensions were conducted independently. 
To ensure the baseline validity of these measures, correlations among the dimensions of 
quality and among multiple rating sources will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
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4.3 Model 1: Growth Antecedents Model 
 
 The purpose of Model 1 is to test alternative antecedents of growth in a network 
industry. Hypotheses 1a and 2 hold that installed base and product quality each have a 
significant impact on growth in a network industry. To test these hypotheses, a model 
was developed that incorporated each of these variables, and several control variables 
(Model 1). 
 
(1) lnSi, t+1 - lnSi, t = β0 + β1 (lnSi, t) + β2 (lnSi, t)2 + β3 (Qi, t) + β4 (MSi, t) +  β5 (MSi, t* lnSi, 
t) + β6...j(CONTROLS) 
 
Where S is the size of a product’s installed base, Q is product quality, and MS is 
the market share of the product. The specific variables in the model, as well as the logic 
underlying their measurement, are described in the following sections. 
 
 
4.3.1 Dependent Variable 
 
Installed Base Growth. The dependent variable of interest is installed base growth 
over time for a given product. Precise measures of installed base can be difficult to 
ascertain, as such a measure should account for both new adopters and consumers who 
have abandoned the product in a previous period. Following Chacko and Mitchell (1998), 
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this study holds that lagged cumulative unit sales over a two-year period provide a 
reasonable approximation of a product’s installed base.  
 Extant literature indicates that taking the difference of the logged installed bases 
in each time period allows for the preservation of assumptions about the normality of the 
distribution of the dependent variable. As such, growth is operationalized as the 
difference between the natural logs of size of the product’s installed base at times t0 and 
t+1, i.e., the size of the current base less the size of the base in the previous year7 (again 
following Chacko & Mitchell, 1998). 
 
4.3.2 Independent Variables 
 Installed Base Size. Issues surrounding the measurement of installed base were 
previously discussed with respect to the dependent variable. Installed base size was 
measured as the natural log of cumulative unit shipments over a two-year period. A 
quadratic term was also included in the model, to account for possible curvilinear effects 
resulting from increasingly positive returns to size.  
 
Product Quality8.  Measures of product quality were gathered from archival issues of 
InfoWorld magazine, a publication that reviews and rates various information 
technologies. For each software release, InfoWorld provided two sets of ratings, one 
overall rating, and ratings in six sub-categories related to product quality: performance, 
                                                 
7 Note that in strict econometric terms, the dependent variable should be divided by the interval over which 
growth is being measured (d). Because this interval is one year (d=1), I have excluded it from the model for 
clarity. (See Evans 1987, Chacko & Mitchell 1998 for a similar rationale) 
 
8 In this section, I briefly describe the nature of the quality measures. For a more comprehensive 
discussion, see section 5.2, “On the Nature and Reliability of Quality Measures” 
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documentation, ease of learning, ease of use, technical support, and value. Correlations 
among these dimensions will be reported in Chapter 5.  
 The use of archival reviews in rating software assumes that such reviews are 
relatively unbiased – i.e., the quality rating is an accurate reflection of the product’s 
actual quality, and that the ratings are not systematically biased or subject to excess 
measurement error. To test the validity of these assumptions, a sub-sample of product 
releases was used to calculate the reliability the quality ratings by comparing them to two 
other sources of independent reviews, PC World and PC Magazine. The results of these 
reliability estimates will be reported in Chapter 5. 
 Archival reviews also possess certain advantages over alternative measures of 
quality such as retrospective surveys or price-based indices. For example, retrospective 
surveys may be subject to systematic hindsight biases among respondents, while archival 
reviews with reliability checks should provide more unbiased estimates of quality relative 
to alternative technologies available at a given time. 
 
 Interactive Terms. To test the moderation hypothesis, interactive terms between 
market share and installed base and market share and quality were included in the model. 
In order to test Hypothesis 1b, the continuous market share variable was coded as “1” for 
medium market share (.34 - .66), and “0” for values lower or higher than this range. 
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Table 4.2: Summary of independent variables (growth model) 
 
Variable Definition Measure Type Source 
Installed 
Base 
Active users of the focal 
product 
Cumulative units 
shipped over 
previous two years 
Continuous IDC/DataQuest 
     
Quality Superiority or inferiority of 
physical attributes of the 
product relative to competing 
products, independent of the 
benefits conferred by its 
network size  
Overall score on 10-
point scale at the time 
of release 
Continuous InfoWorld, 
reliability checks 
with other journals 
     
Market 
share 
Percentage of the market 
occupied by a product in a 
given year 
Product sales divided 
by market size; coded 
as low/ high 
(MS<.33, >.67 = 0) 
or medium (MS>.34, 
<.67 = 1)  
Proportion  
 
 
4.3.3 Control Variables 
  
 Suite membership. Beginning in the early 1990s, many individual software 
applications were bundled and sold as productivity suites. While a bundling strategy may 
impact firm performance (Bakos & Brynjolffson, 1999), it may also make it more 
difficult for consumers to place a discrete value on an individual application within the 
suite (Katz & Shapiro, 1994). 
 
 Multi-segment firm. A firm’s presence in multiple segments may have a twofold 
impact on performance. First, firms that compete in distinct yet related segments are 
thought to possess certain structural advantages over their competitors (Rumelt, 1973; 
 38
Bettis 1981). Second, such firms may be able to exploit relevant knowledge about 
software products and processes across multiple segments (Henderson and Cockburn, 
1996 ; Tanrivierdi and Venkatraman, 2004). 
 
 Price. Product price has been characterized as a critical strategic variable in 
network competition (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). Yet if pricing strategy fully accounts 
for subsequent growth patterns, then there is little benefit in accounting for antecedents of 
growth outside of simple firm economies of scale. As such, list price for each product 
was included in the model.   
 
 Concentration. The degree of industry concentration may have a significant 
influence on firm innovation, profitability, and growth potential (Stigler, 1964; Buzzell, 
Gale and Sultan, 1975; Porter 1980). I have included one measure of concentration, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which indicates the sum of the squared market 
shares of competitors, to control for concentration effects at the segment level (Curry and 
George, 1983).  
 
Table 4.3: Summary of control variables (growth model) 
 
Variable Definition Measure Type Source 
Suite Whether the product was 
released as part of a 
productivity suite or stand-
alone 
Dummy variable 
indicating suite 
membership or 
non-membership 
Binary Various archival 
sources 
     
Multi-
segment 
Sponsoring firm competes in 
more than one segment 
Dummy variable 
indicating single 
segment or multi-
segment 
Binary Various archival 
sources 
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Price List price of the focal product Price (U.S. 
Dollars) of the 
product 
Continuous IDC/DataQuest 
     
Concentration Degree of concentration of 
the focal market segment 
Herfindahl Index Continuous   
 
 
4.4 Model 2: Network Intensity   
 
 The purpose of Model 2 is to test variation in the magnitude of size-on-growth 
effects across segments in a network industry. Specifically, Hypothesis 3 is tested via the 
interaction of a network intensity variable with installed base size to determine whether 
the impact of installed base on growth varies significantly as network intensity increases 
in a market segment: 
 
(2) lnSi, t+1 – lnSi, t = β0 + β1 (lnSi, t) + β2 (Qi, t) + β3 (NI * lnSi, t) + β4...j(CONTROLS) 
 
 Where S is the size of a product’s installed base, Q is the network-independent 
quality of the product, and NI is the network intensity of the product segment. The 
precise coding scheme for the network intensity variable is described in the following 
section. 
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4.4.1 Network Intensity Variable 
 
Network Intensity. Network intensity reflects the proportion of total value that 
consumers derive from network interaction for a given product, ceteris paribus. Given the 
complexity of this construct, its use in this research is of a highly exploratory nature. As a 
first step toward understanding the nature and influence of network intensity, I have 
coded each of the five segments in two ways: first, an ordinal ranking of the segment’s 
network intensity, and second, a broader categorical coding of “high” or “low” network 
intensity. Specifically, products in the word processing and spreadsheet segments were 
coded high, while others were coded low. The coding of each segment was based on the 
criteria described in Table 3.2. The first criterion is direct network effects, or the extent to 
which the cumulative size of the network affects product value. Second, viability effects 
capture the extent to which learning and/or switching costs present a significant burden 
for adopters, based on complexity of the focal technology. As such, the role of the 
network as a proxy for reducing uncertainty about the long-term viability of the product 
takes on increased importance. Finally, indirect effects reflect the extent to which 
complementary products play a role in influencing adoption decisions. Tables 3.2 and 4.4 
illustrate the logic and basis for the categorical coding of each segment. 
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Table 4.4: Network intensity in packaged application software 
 
Segment Direct Effects Uncertainty/ 
Viability Effects 
Indirect Effects Network 
Intensity 
NI1 NI2 
Word Processing High Medium Medium-High HIGH 5 1 
 
(Katz & Shapiro, 
1994) 
 
Widespread 
interaction 
among users in 
the workplace 
 
 
Initial switching 
costs strong, but 
increasing 
compatibility, 
GUIs increasing 
the ease of 
switching 
 
 
Availability of 
plug-ins, 
accessories may 
draw borderline 
adopters 
   
Spreadsheets High Medium-High Medium  HIGH 4 1 
 
(Gandal, 1995; 
Brynjolffoson & 
Kemerer, 1996) 
 
Widespread 
interaction 
among users in 
the workplace 
 
 
Many complex 
functions, macros 
unique among 
products, raising 
switching costs 
 
 
Primarily 
interaction with 
external 
databases 
   
CAD Medium-Low Medium Medium MED. 3 0 
 
(Astebro, 2002) 
 
Users tend to be 
highly 
specialized; 
findings suggest 
low size-on-
growth impact 
 
High-end products 
can run into the 
thousands of 
dollars; design 
interfaces range 
from intuitive to 
highly complex 
 
 
Various plug-ins 
and extensions 
available 
   
Desktop 
Publishing 
Medium Low Medium LOW 2 0 
  
Intra-
organization 
compatibility is 
more important 
than gross 
network size 
 
 
Most interfaces are 
graphically based, 
similar to word 
processors 
 
Compatibility 
with photo, 
illustration 
software is a 
concern 
   
Personal Finance Low Low Medium LOW 1 0 
  
Prior to 
Internet, 
virtually no 
network 
interaction 
required 
 
 
Most low-end 
applications 
require limited 
proprietary 
learning 
 
Initially low, 
increasingly 
prevalent with 
online functions 
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 Although the dependent and independent variables included in the Network 
Intensity model are similar to those in the previous model, Table 4.5 provides a 
comprehensive overview of the specific variables and their measurement. 
 
Table 4.5: Summary of independent variables (network intensity model) 
 
Variable Definition Measure Type Source 
Installed 
Base 
Active users of the focal 
product 
Cumulative units shipped 
over previous two years 
Continuous IDC/DataQuest 
     
Quality Superiority or 
inferiority of physical 
attributes of the product 
relative to competing 
products, independent 
of the benefits conferred 
by its network size  
Overall score on 10-point 
scale at the time of release 
Continuous InfoWorld, 
reliability 
checks with 
other journals 
     
Network 
Intensity 
Proportion of total value 
that consumers derive 
from network 
interaction for a given 
product 
Dummy variable reflecting 
conjectured network 
intensity 
Dummy and 
Rank (Ordinal) 
Archival 
literature 
     
Network 
Intensity 
* 
Installed 
Base 
Interaction term 
reflecting significant 
variation in size-on 
growth effects as 
network intensity 
changes at the segment 
level 
Interaction term Interaction Multiplicative 
combination of 
individual 
variables 
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Table 4.6: Summary of control variables (network intensity model) 
 
Variable Definition Measure Type Source 
Suite Whether the product was 
released as part of a 
productivity suite or 
stand-alone 
Dummy variable 
indicating suite 
membership or non-
membership 
Binary Various archival 
sources 
     
Multi-
segment 
Sponsoring firm 
competes in more than 
one segment 
Dummy variable 
indicating single 
segment or multi-
segment 
Binary Various archival 
sources 
     
Price List price of the focal 
product 
Price (U.S. Dollars) of 
the product 
Continuous IDC/DataQuest 
     
Concentration Degree of concentration 
of the focal market 
segment 
Herfindahl Index Continuous   
 
 
4.5 Model 3: Quality Antecedents Model 
 
 The purpose of Model 3 is to test size and timing of product release as significant 
antecedents of quality, thus suggesting a mediated relationship among installed base, 
quality, and growth in a network industry. Specifically, Hypotheses 4 and 5 hold that 
within periods, installed base size and timing of release have a significant impact on the 
quality of a given product. To test these hypotheses, Model 3 holds that: 
 
(3) Qt = β0 + β1(lnSi, t) + β2(Ti, t) + β3..j(CONTROLS) 
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 Where Q is product quality, S is the product’s installed base, and T indicates first-
mover or late mover status. The specific variables in the model, as well as the logic 
underlying their measurement, are described below. 
 
 
 
4.5.1 Dependent Variable   
 
 Product Quality. Quality ratings from archival issues of InfoWorld magazine were 
again used to measure the quality of product releases at the time of their release. 
Reliability estimates were calculated using alternative sources, and will be reported in the 
Chapter 5. 
 
4.5.2 Independent Variables 
 
 Installed Base Size. As in Model 1, installed base size was measured as the 
natural log of cumulative unit shipments over a two-year period. 
 
 First Mover Status. In order to test Hypothesis 5, the release date of each product 
release in the sample was recorded. Because software releases tend to be concurrent or 
generational in nature across firms, timing of release was calculated as the time (in 
months) that a product was released after the first innovation of a given generation of 
software. For measurement purposes, product releases were then aggregated and coded as 
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first-movers and late-movers (non first-movers). This measure is consistent with the 
specific language of Hypothesis 5, that first-movers will exhibit lower quality than later 
ones. 
 
Table 4.7: Summary of independent variables (quality model) 
 
Variable Definition Measure Type Source 
Installed 
Base 
Active users of the 
focal product 
Cumulative units shipped 
over previous two years 
Continuous IDC/DataQuest 
     
First 
Mover 
Whether the product 
was the first release in 
its segment for a given 
generation of products 
Dummy variable indicating 
first mover or later release 
Binary Various archival 
trade journals 
 
 
 
4.5.3 Control Variables 
  
 Previous Winner. When quality attributes are difficult to observe a priori, 
consumers may rely on a product’s brand or reputation when making adoption decisions 
(Keller, 1993; Randall, Ulrich & Reibstein, 1998). To control for reputation effects, I 
included a variable indicating whether the product was the highest-rated one in the 
previous period (t-1).  
 
 Generational Innovation. A generational product innovation represents a 
significant advance in the performance of an existing product (Lawless and Anderson, 
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1996). In contrast, incremental product innovation tends to reinforce existing product 
designs, leaving the core aspects of the product unchanged (Henderson and Clark, 1990). 
I include a variable indicating the nature of the product based on its numbering scheme, 
i.e. the product was coded generational if its version represented a whole number (2, 2.0 
etc.), and incremental if the version contained one or more decimal points (5.1, 5.01, etc.) 
 
Platform. I included a variable indicating the operating system platform for which 
the software was designed – DOS or Windows. This variable was included to ensure that 
quality dimensions are not platform-dependent, and that quality reviews did not confound 
product-specific quality with platform-specific quality.  
 
Table 4.8: Summary of control variables (quality model) 
 
Variable Definition Measure Type Source 
Suite Whether the product 
was released as part 
of a productivity 
suite or stand-alone 
Dummy variable 
indicating suite 
membership or non-
membership 
Binary Various archival 
sources 
     
Generational 
Innovation 
Whether the product 
is a generational or 
incremental 
innovation 
Dummy variable 
indicating whether the 
product is generational or 
incremental 
Continuous IDC/DataQuest 
     
Previous 
Winner 
Whether the product 
line was the highest 
rated one in the 
previous year (t-1) 
Dummy variable 
indicating previous 
winner 
Binary InfoWorld 
     
Platform Whether the product 
is designed for the 
DOS or Windows 
platform 
Dummy variable 
indicating DOS or 
Windows 
Binary  
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 This chapter presents the results of the descriptive and empirical methodologies 
described in the previous chapter. Characteristics of the sample are presented, followed 
by empirical results of the tests of hypotheses. Finally, limitations of the methodologies 
are discussed in the context of their relevance to the focal tests. 
 
5.1 Data Overview and Descriptive Statistics 
 
 The raw sample for this study encompasses five segments of packaged application 
software, word processing, personal finance, spreadsheet, desktop publishing, and CAD. 
Table 5.1 illustrates descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for the sample. 
 Several features of the correlation matrix merit further discussion. First, note that 
growth is negatively correlated with installed base (-.37), yet it exhibits a positive 
association with quality (.17). Second, higher network intensity segments appear to be 
associated with higher baseline growth (.19), which is consistent with the notion of 
stronger positive feedback in these segments. Finally, it appears that multi-segment firms 
have significant advantages with respect to several performance metrics, including 
baseline quality and growth.  
 Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
 Mean S.D.  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Growth* 0.17 1.51        
          
2. Installed base* 13.98 1.94  -0.37      
          
3. Quality 7.35 1.31  0.17 0.35     
          
4. Network 
intensity 2.87 1.41 
 
0.19 0.47 0.02    
          
5. Market share 20.72 20.01  0.28 0.62 0.42 0.25   
          
6. Concentration 
(HHI) 0.40 0.17 
 
0.08 0.65 0.25 0.17 0.45   
          
7. Suite 0.21 0.41  0.01 0.44 0.32 -0.13 0.35 0.64 
          
8. Price 499.92 98.39  -0.20 -0.45 -0.25 -0.31 -0.17 -0.48 
          
9. Multi-segment 
firm 0.25 0.43 
 
0.28 0.59 0.60 0.08 0.56 0.40 
          
10. First mover 0.33 0.27  -0.03 -0.16 -0.14 -0.09 -0.18 -0.15 
          
          
8. Price    7 8 9    
    -0.21      
9. Multi-segment 
firm   
 
      
    0.40 -0.20     
10. First mover          
    -0.14 0.05 -0.13    
* Variables are expressed in natural log form (ln), growth in differences in natural logs 
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 Note also that the segments in the sample exhibit a relatively high degree of  
concentration (µ=0.40), which is indicative of the network-intensive nature of several of 
the segments.9 
 
5.2 On the Nature and Reliability of Quality Measures 
  
 As noted in previous sections, quality has a broad and multidimensional 
connotation in the strategy literature. Furthermore, in evaluating the characteristics of 
archival products, there is a risk of hindsight bias, whereby raters’ recollections may 
systematically influenced by the performance outcomes of the focal products (Baron & 
Hershey, 1988). To minimize such bias, I used quality ratings that were published at the 
time of product release. For 151 product releases, I was able to obtain data on both 
official product release dates and the date of the quality review. For this group - 
approximately 72% of the total sample - an average of 2.2 months of time elapsed 
between official product release and the initial quality review, suggesting limited 
opportunities for performance outcomes to influence ratings. 
 From an empirical perspective, the reliability of the quality measure can be tested 
in two contexts. The first is the convergent validity of the quality construct, or the extent 
to which multiple external measures of the construct are correlated (Campbell & Fiske, 
1959; Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1993). The second is that the construct is internally 
                                                 
9 The U.S. Department of Justice characterizes industries between HHI .10 and .18 as “moderately 
concentrated”, and those over HHI .18 as “concentrated”. However, when gauging the competitive impact 
of horizontal mergers, the degree of change in HHI tends to supercede the HHI itself. See Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines, U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 1992, 1997. 
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consistent, i.e. that measures accurately capture similar dimensions of the phenomenon 
over repeated observation (Cronbach, 1951; Lord & Novick, 1968).  
 To establish the convergent validity of the quality construct, I took a sub-sample 
of 15 InfoWorld quality ratings and compared them with those from PC Magazine, an 
alternative journal that offered user ratings of software product. The resulting average 
inter-measure covariance (0.78) indicates a strong degree of construct validity among 
alternative external measures. 
 A correlation matrix of the various quality dimensions was used to determine the 
internal consistency of the ratings (Table 5.2). Note that all sub-dimensions of quality are 
highly correlated with overall quality measure (all >0.50). 
 
 
Table 5.2: Correlations: Quality and sub-dimensions 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Overall Quality        
        
2. Performance 0.58       
        
3. Documentation 0.61 0.38      
        
4. Ease of Learning 0.57 0.34 0.45     
        
5. Ease of Use 0.64 0.25 0.34 0.29    
        
6. Error Handling 0.71 0.53 0.48 0.50 0.34   
        
7. Technical Support 0.56 0.47 0.43 0.38 0.38 0.58  
        
8. Value 0.82 0.48 0.54 0.64 0.50 0.63 0.47 
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 Finally, quality data were missing or incomplete for approximately 19% of the 
observations in the sample. Because these observations contained other valuable product 
data, I used a multiple imputation technique to approximate missing values (see 
Appendix B for details). Nonetheless, while specific quality rankings were absent for this 
portion of the sample, complete data was available for two other metrics of quality: the 
rank of the product’s quality relative to other products, and whether the product was 
declared the “winner” of its class of products. To ensure the general validity of the 
interpolated values, I compared the final sample of actual and interpolated values with 
these two alternative metrics, and a reliability test indicated strong reliability among these 
alternative metrics (α = .88)  
 
 
5.3 Results of Longitudinal Models 
 
Recall that three models were proposed to test the following hypotheses regarding 
network industries: 
 
(1) lnSi, t+1 - lnSi, t = β0 + β1 (lnSi, t) + β2 (lnSi, t)2 + β3 (Qi, t) + β4 (MSi, t) +  β5 (MSi, t* 
lnSi, t) + β6...j(CONTROLS) 
 
(2)      lnSi, t+1 – lnSi, t = β0 + β1 (lnSi, t) + β2 (Qi, t) + β3 (NI * lnSi, t) + β4...j(CONTROLS) 
 
(3)      Qt = β0 + β1(lnSi, t) + β2(Ti, t) + β3..j(CONTROLS) 
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 These models were developed to test the six hypotheses related to size, quality 
and growth in network industries. 
 
Table 5.3: Summary of hypotheses 
 
 
H1a 
 
 
In a network industry, the larger the installed base of a product, the 
greater its growth in the following period. 
 
 
H1b 
 
 
In a network industry, the relationship between installed base and growth 
will be more positive at medium levels of market share than at high or 
low levels. 
 
 
H2 
 
 
In a network industry, the greater the quality of a product at a given time, 
the greater its installed base growth in the following period. 
 
 
H3 
 
 
The effect of installed base size on growth will increase as the network 
intensity of a segment increases. 
 
 
H4 
 
 
The size of a firm’s installed base will be positively associated with the 
quality of its product releases. 
 
 
H5 
 
 
Within generational products, first movers will tend to exhibit lower 
quality than later releases. 
 
 
 
 Model 1 (Table 5.4) illustrates a longitudinal analysis of the antecedents of 
growth in a network industry, with the difference in installed bases between periods 
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(lnSi,t+1 – lnSi,t) as the dependent variable. When longitudinal data has panel 
characteristics (as in this case), OLS regression estimates can be biased if omitted the 
influence of omitted variables on explanatory variables is non-trivial (Hausman, 1978; 
Kennedy, 2003). Thus, both random effects and fixed effects models were run, with 
diagnostics indicating a better fit for the fixed effects model for both Model 1 and Model 
2 (p<0.001, p=0.002, respectively). 
 
Table 5.4: Model 1 (growth antecedents model) 
DV = Growth (lnSi, t+1 - lnSi, t) 
 1  2  3 
Growth Antecedents  
      
   (ln) Installed Base  -3.631*** 
(<0.001) 
 -3.172*** 
(<0.001) 
 -2.939*** 
(0.001) 
      
   (ln) Installed Base2 0.117*** 
(0.003) 
 0.095*** 
(<0.001) 
 0.085** 
(0.010) 
      
   (ln) Quality  1.286** 
(0.038) 
 0.284 
(.685) 
 1.928** 
(0.025) 
      
Interaction Terms      
      
   Installed Base *Market Share 
 
 0.048*** 
(<0.001) 
 0.277** 
(0.044) 
      
   Quality*Market Share 
 
 
 
 -0.017 
(0.142) 
Control Variables      
      
   Concentration (HHI) 
 
 
 
 0.802 
(0.445) 
      
   Price  
 
 
 
 0.002 
(0.849) 
      
   Suite 
 
 
 
 0.328 
(0.332) 
      
   Multi-segment firm     1.265** 
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(0.047) 
   
     *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
 Hypothesis 1a proposes a positive relationship between installed base size and 
growth in a network industry. The three iterations of Model 1 illustrate a generally 
negative linear effect of size on growth. However, the positive coefficient on the 
quadratic term indicates that the effect of size on growth becomes less negative as size 
increases. While this result seems to run counter to theories of positive feedback and 
increasing returns, it is consistent with the notion a viable mass of adopters is critical in 
network-based competition, and positive feedback manifests only after this critical 
threshold is reached.10 Nonetheless, Hypothesis 1a is not supported by the results of 
Model 1.  
 Hypothesis 1b accounts for “S-curve” effects in the product adoption process, and 
holds that firms with particularly low or high market shares will enjoy weaker size-on-
growth benefits than those at medium levels of market share. The positive and significant 
coefficient on the interaction term between Market Share (where 0=low/high, 1=medium) 
and Installed Base (0.277, p = .04) supports Hypothesis 1b.  
 Hypothesis 2 proposes that a product’s quality at a given time will have a positive 
impact on its growth in the following period. Model 1 illustrates strong support for this 
hypothesis, as the coefficient on quality is positive in all three iterations. Although the 
estimate falls below the significance threshold in the second iteration of the model, it is 
positive and significant in the full model with controls. 
                                                 
10 This result is consistent with the findings of Chacko and Mitchell (1998), which conducts one of the few 
direct size-on-growth tests in the network effects literature. 
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 Model 2 (Table 5.5) is a variation on Model 1 where network intensity is the 
primary measure of interest. Hypothesis 3 holds that the impact of size on growth will be 
increasingly positive as the network intensity of a segment increases. Hypothesis 3 is 
supported, as the interaction term between network intensity and installed base is positive 
and strongly significant when the term is included. However, the significance of the 
independent variables drop significantly when the interaction term is included, possibly 
as a result of high correlation between the rank-ordered network intensity variable and 
installed base (Table 5.1). To test the robustness of the finding of a significant impact of 
network intensity, I specified an alternative form of Model 2, where network intensity 
was coded high (1) if the product was a spreadsheet or word processor, and low (0) if it 
was a member of another segment (Table 5.6). 
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Table 5.5: Model 2 (network intensity model) 
DV = Growth (lnSi, t+1 - lnSi, t) 
 1  2  3 
Growth Antecedents  
      
   (ln) Installed Base -3.631*** 
(<0.001) 
 -1.394* 
(0.072) 
 -1.048 
(0.270) 
      
   (ln) Installed Base2 0.117*** 
(0.003) 
 0.052** 
(0.040) 
 0.047 
(0.134) 
      
   (ln) Quality 1.286** 
(0.038) 
 0.582 
(0.402) 
 0.831 
(0.293) 
      
Network Intensity      
      
   Network Intensity*Installed Base 
 
 0.231*** 
(<0.001) 
 0.337** 
(0.001) 
      
Control Variables      
      
   Concentration (HHI) 
 
 
 
 -1.757 
(0.214) 
      
   Price  
 
 
 
 0.002 
(0.982) 
      
   Suite 
 
 
 
 -0.068 
(0.825) 
      
   Multi-segment firm 
 
 
 
 0.508 
(0.387) 
 
   *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 5.6: Model 2 (alternative specification for network intensity model) 
 DV = Growth (lnSi, t+1 - lnSi, t) 
 1  2  3 
Growth Antecedents  
      
   (ln) Installed Base -3.631*** 
(<0.001) 
 -2.815*** 
(<0.001) 
 -3.245*** 
(<0.001) 
      
   (ln) Installed Base2 0.117*** 
(0.003) 
 0.0911*** 
(<0.001) 
 0.105*** 
(0.001) 
      
   (ln) Quality 1.286** 
(0.038) 
 1.268* 
(0.073) 
 1.763** 
(0.029) 
      
Network Intensity      
      
   Network Intensity*Installed Base 
 
 0.035*** 
(<0.001) 
 0.031** 
(0.037) 
      
Control Variables      
      
   Concentration (HHI) 
 
 
 
 0.079 
(0.954) 
      
   Price  
 
 
 
 0.002 
(0.864) 
      
   Suite 
 
 
 
 -0.063 
(0.849) 
      
   Multi-segment firm 
 
 
 
 1.054* 
(0.081) 
 
   *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
 While the parameter estimate on the network intensity interaction term is lower in 
the alternate model, it remains positive and significant. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is supported 
by both forms of the model. 
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 Hypotheses 4 and 5 postulate the effects of installed base and first-mover status 
on product quality at a given time. Because these effects are hypothesized to be within-
period effects, I used an OLS technique with controls to estimate Model 3: 
  
Table 5.7: Model 3 (quality antecedents model) 
DV = Quality (Qt) 
 
 1  2 
Quality Antecedents    
    
   (ln)Installed base  0.050** 
(0.002) 
 0.064** 
(0.011) 
    
   First-mover -0.011 
(0.847) 
 -0.063 
(0.284) 
    
Control Variables    
    
   Generational innovation 
 
 -0.026 
(.576) 
    
   Platform 
 
 0.113** 
(0.041) 
    
   Previous Winner 
 
 0.0984** 
(0.050) 
    
   Suite 
 
 -0.038 
(0.557) 
    
  Adjusted R2 = 0.1439, 0.1588 
     *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
 
 Model 3 tests alternative theories of quality-based learning in a network industry. 
The results support an experienced-based perspective on learning (Hypothesis 4; ß = 
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0.064, p=0.001). However, while the direction of the coefficient on the first-mover term 
is consistent with a time-based learning perspective, it is insignificant in both iterations of 
the model (p1 = .85, p2 = .28). Thus, the results do not provide sufficient support for 
Hypothesis 5.  
 
5.4 Summary of Hypothesis Tests 
 
 In summary, the results do not support a positive size on growth argument in a 
network industry, but are consistent with the notion that the influence of size becomes 
more positive after a certain threshold. In contrast, product quality has a generally 
positive and significant impact on growth, which persists throughout the nested models. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that size has an increasingly positive impact on growth 
as the network intensity of a segment increases. Finally, cumulative experience via 
installed base appears to have a significant impact on the quality of a firm’s product 
releases, while delaying releases within generational products does not appear to have a 
significant impact on quality. 
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 Table 5.8: Summary of hypothesis tests 
 
H1a 
 
 
In a network industry, the larger the installed base of a product, 
the greater its growth in the following period. 
 
 
 
Not supported (negative 
linear term, positive quadratic 
term) 
 
 
H1b 
 
 
In a network industry, the relationship between installed base 
and growth will be more positive at medium levels of market 
share than at high or low levels. 
 
 
 
Supported 
 
H2 
 
 
 
In a network industry, the greater the quality of a product at a 
given time, the greater its installed base growth in the 
following period. 
 
 
Supported 
 
H3 
 
 
The effect of installed base size on growth will increase as the 
network intensity of a segment increases. 
 
 
 
Supported 
 
H4 
 
 
The size of a firm’s installed base will be positively associated 
with the quality of its product releases. 
 
 
 
Supported 
 
H5 
 
 
Within generational products, first movers will tend to exhibit 
lower quality than later releases. 
 
 
 
Not Supported 
 
 
5.4 Limitations  
 
 As is the case with many empirical studies in strategic management, this research 
was limited by several factors outside of the control of the researcher. While the 
preliminary results indicate support for several of the hypotheses, I note these limitations 
in the hope that several can be overcome in future research in this area.  
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 First, the sample for this study was limited to a single network industry. While 
network intensity was tested via variation in multiple segments of the industry, a more 
representative cross-section of high- and low- network intensity industries may prove 
fruitful for future empirical research. Furthermore, though the time frame of the sample 
was consciously chosen for its high-growth nature, it would have been ideal to examine 
the industry from its inception. However, limitations in the availability of data earlier 
than 1986 made this approach less viable. 
 Second, product quality is a highly complex and multi-dimensional construct. 
Though I have taken reasonable steps to ensure the theoretical and empirical validity of 
quality, the possibility remains that critical dimensions of quality remain unaccounted. In 
addition, future work should involve alternative measures of quality to ensure that 
common-method bias is not a factor in these results.11 
 Finally, I have made a conscious trade-off between depth and breadth in 
developing the sample for this study. While the sample size is smaller than some 
comparable longitudinal studies of growth, recent studies have made similar concessions 
with respect to sample size in order to gain a deeper understanding of network 
dynamics.12 Furthermore, to my knowledge no other study of network effects 
incorporates the depth of quality data that I have gathered from archival sources. 
                                                 
11 One unsettling possibility is that the actual journal reviews influence growth more than the product’s 
“true” quality. However, the correlations of both quality dimensions and multiple journal reviews have 
mitigated this possibility to some extent.  
 
12 Consider that Chacko and Mitchell (1998) incorporates 1,673 product-year observations, yet does not 
measure quality-on-growth; conversely, Shankar and Bays (2003) use a sample of only 64 product-months 
in estimating firm-level network effects. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Implications for Strategic Management in Network Industries 
 
 The empirical results of this work have implications for strategic management in 
network industries in both the theoretical and practitioner domains. The following 
sections briefly describe some of these implications, and offer potential avenues for 
extension and future research in this domain. 
 
6.1.1. Theoretical Implications and Extensions 
 
  Theoretical perspectives on strategy in network industries generally focus on the 
importance of the installed base in these settings. Yet the empirical results of this 
research indicate that quality of a firm’s product releases plays a significant role in 
driving installed base growth in a network industry. More broadly, the results illustrate 
that the dynamics of competition and growth in network industries may be more complex 
than previously thought. In contrast to straightforward assumptions about positive size on 
growth mechanisms, I have shown that many firms in network industries can face strong 
negative feedback, particularly when they fail to achieve a viable installed base in the 
focal segment. In turn, the achievement of such viability appears to be significantly 
dependent upon the quality of a firm’s products.  
 In addition to this general finding, I have shown that an existing installed base is 
associated with quality advantages at the segment level. This finding suggests that 
dominant firms in network industries may not only offer greater network-dependent value 
to consumers (i.e., a larger network of fellow adopters), but also greater network-
independent value in the form of higher quality products. Thus, the assumed disconnect 
between product quality and performance outcomes in network industries may not be as 
strong as previous anecdotal evidence suggests. Indeed, it appears that the relationships 
among installed base, product quality and growth represent far more than simple luck or 
randomness. 
 Furthermore, the results show that the extent of positive feedback due to network 
effects varies significantly based on the characteristics of a given market or segment. This 
finding lends further support to the notion that network intensity can be conceptualized as 
the proportion of value that consumers derive from network interaction in a given setting, 
and has important strategic implications in various industries. 
 Several avenues of research may offer additional insights on the nature of network 
industries. First, installed base was found to have a significant association with product 
quality at the segment level, consistent with the notion of learning advantages from 
cumulative production experience. However, while larger firms may enjoy greater 
accumulated product knowledge, their incentives to capitalize on this knowledge merits 
further investigation. Specifically, in a network industry, larger firms may have less 
incentive to produce innovative and higher quality products as a result of their position of 
 64
dominance in the segment (Christensen, 1997). Examining the relative impact of positive 
advantages to size against negative incentives to innovate in a network industry may 
provide deeper insights into the nature of product innovation in network competition.    
 Second, the empirical results suggest that the impact of installed base on growth 
tends to be more positive as installed base increases. However, the precise level at which 
a firm can overcome negative early feedback to enjoy increasing demand-side returns to 
scale, as well as the extent to which this level is heterogeneous across industries, remains 
unclear. Establishing both the incidence and nature of such “tipping points” in multiple 
contexts represents a logical next step for the literature on strategy and network effects. 
 Finally, the impact of new entrants on network industries merits further empirical 
investigation. If installed base and quality are mechanisms for growth in these settings, 
how can entrepreneurs overtake incumbent competitors? In other words, when installed 
base is zero, what other advantages might new entrants exploit to produce higher quality 
products, and thus overtake industry leaders? 
 
6.1.2 Practical Implications and Extensions 
  
 This research offers several insights for strategy practitioners. First, the notion 
that first-mover status is vital to success in a network industry does not appear to hold in 
all contexts. Rather, effective strategy in network competition appears to center around 
managing the trade-offs involved in these settings, specifically balancing the advantages 
of early product release against delays which may improve product quality and impact 
tthe growth potential of the firm. 
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 Second, the notion of network intensity has important implications for firm 
strategy. If the influence of network effects varies across competitive contexts, then the 
ability to accurately gauge the network intensity of a given market or segment becomes a 
critical firm capability. Inaccurate perceptions of network intensity can have a 
detrimental impact on performance, as firms may either rush to release low-quality 
products, or delay releases beyond the point of viability. One interesting extension in this 
regard is the application of network intensity to the vast number of failed Internet startups 
earlier this decade. A plausible hypothesis for such failures is that Web-based firms 
chronically overestimated the network intensity of their target industry, and that the most 
viable Web-based business models are those that do indeed provide strong network-based 
value to their customers.  
  Finally, this research was developed under the assumption that network intensity 
is a largely exogenous aspect of a given product-market. However, relaxing this 
assumption may provide valuable insights for strategic management. If firms can partially 
influence the network intensity of their products, then the manipulation of network 
intensity is itself a worthy avenue of future study. Using a prior example, large video-
game console producers have recently added online capabilities to their core products. 
Future work in this domain might examine whether this represents a demand-driven 
evolution of the product-market, or a conscious effort by manufacturers to increase the 
network intensity of their products. 
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6.2 Conclusion 
 
 This work makes four contributions to the burgeoning literature on strategy and 
network effects. First, the impact of installed base on growth in a network industry was 
tested, and shown to be negative below a critical threshold. Second, contrary to extant 
theory, product quality was shown to have a positive and significant impact on installed 
base growth in a network industry. Third, the network intensity of segments within an 
industry varied significantly, suggesting that network effects do not manifest uniformly in 
network competition. Finally, installed base was shown to be associated with higher 
quality products within time periods, suggesting that the influence of installed base lies 
not only in its direct impact on growth, but is also partly mediated by product quality.  
 Taken together, these findings build on previous theoretical and empirical 
findings on strategy and network competition, and illustrate that the dynamics of network 
effects, positive feedback, and demand-side increasing returns are far more complex than 
simple size on growth effects. Future research in this stream will focus on the 
advancement of network intensity as a theoretical construct and a measurement-based 
tool for practitioners of strategic management. 
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APPENDIX A. Sample of Packaged Application Software Product Lines, 1986-1998 
 
Word 
Processing Spreadsheets 
Desktop 
Publishing CAD Personal Finance 
     
WordPerfect Quattro  FrameMaker TurboCAD Quicken  
     
Microsoft Word  Lotus 123 
Ventura 
Publisher Drafix CAD Managing Your Money 
     
DisplayWrite Excel PageMaker Actrix Tech. Money Matters 
     
Samna Word Wingz Quark AutoSketch Money Counts 
     
Ami Pro  Quark Xpress MiniCAD Microsoft Money 
     
Word Pro   IntelliCAD Reality 
     
MultiMate   Corel Visual  
     
WordStar   X CAD  
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APPENDIX B. Treatment of Missing Quality Data 
  
 Approximately 19% of the observations in the dataset contained missing or 
incomplete values for product quality. There appeared to be no common factor 
influencing whether data was present or absent, but rather a function of the idiosyncratic 
nature of the product reviews in the focal publications. However, because several other 
data points were available for these observations (installed base, growth, etc.), I 
attempted to remediate the missing data problem via a multiple imputation technique. 
 Several approaches can be used to address missing data in statistical analysis. The 
most convenient, casewise deletion, involves the simple removal of missing observations 
from the sample. Though this is a convenient approach for the researcher, it may bias the 
sample as the number of omissions increases (Little and Rubin, 1987; Schaefer and 
Graham, 2002).  
 One promising technique for remediation of missing data is multiple imputation, 
whereby each missing value is represented by a distribution of simulated values 
conditional upon existing data. Each of the possible alternative datasets is then analyzed 
to produce an estimate of the missing value, as well as a standard error and uncertainty 
estimate for the value (Rubin, 1996): 
 
μ = m-1 ∑ Q (j) 
 
 Where μ represents the missing sample value, m is the number of unique 
imputations, j is the vector of 1…m imputations, and Q is the estimate of μ. Note that this 
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technique rests on the assumption that the data are missing at random, and the 
characteristics of this sample offer no plausible evidence otherwise.  
 Once imputed values of quality were calculated, I checked the resulting data set 
against two other metrics of quality to determine the validity of the imputed values. 
These alternative metrics were (1) the rank of the product relative to competing products 
and (2) whether the product was the “winner” of its product class. The resulting inter-
measure correlation was as follows: 
 
α = μ [σ (IMPUTED, RANK, WINNER)] = .88 
 
 This average inter-measure correlation indicates a strong degree of reliability 
among the three alternative measures. Thus, the imputed dataset was used for analysis. 
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APPENDIX C. Sources of InfoWorld Quality Reviews 
 
 Infoworld quality reviews constituted the primary measure of software quality for 
this research. Below is a list of the issue dates used to compile the raw quality sample. 
Note that there are 84 dates listed. Some products were reviewed in individual articles, in 
which case a given date appears more than once (e.g. “Drafix CAD delivers precision: 
drafting tools let easy-to-use program beat out comparably priced drawing programs”, 
May 25, 1992). Others were reviewed as part of a broad comparison of products, in 
which case one date may indicate multiple reviews (e.g. “Professional word processors: 
Windows illuminates new features but traditional programs stay competitive”, January 7, 
1991 issue). Specific issue dates included: 
      
November 4, 1985 March 13, 1989 September 9, 1991 December 27, 1993 
November 23, 1985 June 12, 1989 September 16, 1991 February 7, 1994 
May 5, 1986 July 17, 1989 October 7, 1991 February 14, 1994 
June 2, 1986 July 31, 1989 December 16, 1991 February 28, 1994 
August 4, 1986 September 7, 1989 January 13, 1992 December 12, 1994 
February 2, 1987 September 11, 1989 January 27, 1992 January 30, 1995 
March 2, 1987 October 30, 1989 February 10, 1992 March 20, 1995 
March 9, 1987 December 4, 1989 May 25, 1992 November 20, 1995 
March 23, 1987 January 15, 1990 May 25, 1992 February 5, 1996 
April 7, 1987 January 22, 1990 August 3, 1992 February 26, 1996 
April 13, 1987 January 29, 1990 August 31, 1992 October 28, 1996 
July 13, 1987 February 19, 1990 September 28, 1992 November 4, 1996 
August 10, 1987 April 23, 1990 October 12, 1992 July 14, 1997 
November 14, 1987 October 15, 1990 December 14, 1992 December 8, 1997 
November 16, 1987 November 5, 1990 March 15, 1993 December 22, 1997 
February 1, 1988 November 12, 1990 April 12, 1993  
March 28, 1988 December 3, 1990 April 23, 1993  
June 20, 1988 January 7, 1991 August 9, 1993  
August 29, 1988 January 28, 1991 August 23, 1993  
September 26, 1988 April 1, 1991 October 25, 1993  
October 3, 1988 April 29, 1991 November 1, 1993  
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